Abstract-Category 3, Class CID missions have
INTRODUCTION
Category 3 missions are the lowest cost and highest risk missions within NASA's science portfolio. Category 3 missions do, however, provide significant benefit to NASA by providing important science contributions at a low cost. [1] [2] [3] The success of Category 3 missions becomes even more important at this time when NASA budgets are becoming more and more restrictive. The continued success of Category 3 missions will be important to NASA's future.
NASA has developed a set of guiding documents to provide different requirements and governing principles for missions of differing levels of criticality.
NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 7120.5E defmes different categories of missions based on their priority to NASA's strategic goals 978-1-4673-1813-6/13/$31.00 ©2013 IEEE and their relative total mission life cycle cost (LCC), as shown in Table 1 . [4] Similarly, NPR 8705.4 defmes different classes of missions based upon a variety of factors, as shown in Table 2 . [5] The defmitions of mission categories and classes allow a distinction between missions in terms of guidelines for development. Although there are clear guidelines for elements such as parts selection and testing requirements, the review requirements for these missions are much more ambiguous. This ambiguity often leads review teams to default to the common practices and extensive requirements of larger missions. As a result, the lower priority, lower cost Category 3, Class C/D missions are being reviewed similar to high priority, higher cost Category lI2, Class AlB missions. A common statement in NASA is "Every mission is Class A by the time it launches". The primary benefit of Category 3 missions is their ability to collect science data at a relatively low cost. By treating Category 3 missions the same as Category 1 or 2 missions, the effort reduces this benefit and provides a substantial burden on the Category 3 mission project team and reduces the benefit to NASA and its stakeholders. LCC> $IB similar organizations that manage and build Category 3 missions, and provides recommendations for potentially streamlining the review process for Category 3 missions to maintain or improve quality while retaining the benefits of these low cost missions.
BENEFITS OF CATEGORY 3 MISSIONS

Overview
NASA employs a mix of missions within its portfolio to accomplish desired science objectives. Large Category 1 high priority flagship missions, such as the Hubble Space Telescope, are required to answer unique science questions that only a large scale telescope can address. Other missions, like the Cassini and Galileo Orbiters, are the most cost effective way to operate a large number of scientific instruments orbiting a distant planet.
Medium sized Category 2 missions are also important as they can provide focused platforms for science that requires either multiple instruments for simultaneous observations or single medium to large sized instruments that have a unique scientific objective.
Less costly Category 3 missions are also necessary, however, to conduct initial observations or fill gaps in knowledge for certain science disciplines. They can also be significantly more focused in their science objectives, yielding a small, but significant scientific result.
Data Collection and Mission Categorization
To assess the benefit of each category of missions, data were collected for NASA missions launched within the last 15 years. The intent was to do a comparison between Category 1, 2 and 3 missions to characterize their mission cost, failure rate and overall benefit. The result is a set of 62 NASA missions listed individually in the Appendix. The missions included in the study represent a wide range of category and class of missions. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) in FY 12$ as compared to the category and class of the mission. All real year mission cost data were inflated to fiscal year 2012 dollars (FYI2$) so as to represent, as best as possible, the real year dollar guidance for LCC categories as stated in NPR 7120.5E and shown in Table l . As can be seen, Category 1 missions consist of Class A and B missions, where Category 2 missions consist of a balanced mix of Class B and C missions while Category 3 consists of Class C and D missions. Category 3 missions include the lower cost half of the Class C missions launched within the last 15 years. 
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$300 One of the objectives of the paper was to identify the relative science cost/benefit of each mission class. As such, only NASA Science Missions that meet certain criteria were considered. Missions that have recently been launched but have yet to begin their science missions, such as the Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP) and Nuclear Spectroscopic Telescope Array (NuSTAR) missions, were not considered because their success has yet to be determined at the time of writing. Missions that relied heavily on international contributions, such as the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) and CALIPSO missions, were also eliminated from consideration due to the difficulty of assessing foreign costs. Additionally, only full science missions were considered. Therefore "Instrument only" science experiments, where the instrument was provided to another organization, were not considered.
Technology demonstrators, such as NanoSail-D and Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART), were also excluded given that their primary focus is technology demonstration, not science. In addition, operational missions like the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) series, were excluded in order to focus on more typical, one of a kind NASA science missions.
Cost Categorization
The average cost for each mission category is shown in Figure 2 . Given that one of the primary criteria for categorization of missions per NPR 7120.5E is cost, the result is as expected with Category 1 missions being substantially higher than Category 2 missions which are more costly than Category 3 missions. 
Average Cost per Mission
Failure Rate Categorization
The average failure rate for each mission category was also calculated, as shown in Figure 3 with Category 3 missions, being mostly comprised of Class C and D missions, experiencing a much higher failure rate than Category 1 or 2 missions. A mission failure is defined as a launch vehicle or spacecraft failure. An interesting note, which is discussed 3 more in Section 3, is that Category 3 missions also have a much higher non-confirmation rate.
Failure Rate per Category Assessing the benefit of a science mission is typically very subjective as the "value" to one scientist for any given data returned will not be the same as to another scientist in another discipline. There is no perfect way to judge scientific instrument value. To assess the benefit for the purposes of the study, two "science return" metrics were investigated to provide an objective measure of benefit. The first "science return" metric calculates the number of instruments operating over their lifetime and was originally proposed as an objective quantification of overall science value. [6] In addition, a second metric was defined to look at the total data returned from all science instruments over the lifetime of the mission. Other metrics were considered but found to have certain issues that were hard to overcome. For example, the number of papers published by mission scientists was considered but was believed to disproportionately favor large, prolific teams that publish multiple papers versus a small team that publish a few, very significant papers. Similarly, a metric based on the number of "significant" findings that resulted from the mission would be challenging to use given that the term "significant" is very subjective and difficult to quantify. It has also been suggested that the science value of an instrument is proportional to its mass. This metric suggests, however, that planetary missions are inherently less valuable than Earth orbiting missions because planetary missions typically have much less payload mass due to the difficulty of getting its payload to its final destination. Combined, the two proposed metrics should provide a reasonable assessment of the benefit of the different classes.
The first proposed metric uses the number of instruments on-board the satellite multiplied by the length of time the instruments take data at their [mal destination and is measured in terms of "instrument-months." [6] Multiplying by the duration that the instrument operates provides a surrogate for the quantity and depth of information gathered by the instrument. The proposed metric also accounts for full and partial mission failures because the failed mission's instrument duration of operation, and corresponding science return, would be zero.
When this metric is applied to the dataset used for this study, the results are as expected, with Category 1 missions returning more science than Category 2 missions which return more value than Category 3 missions, the results of which are shown in Figure 4 . The second metric closely parallels the instrument-months metric but utilizes the instrument data rate and operating durations to calculate the data returned from the mission data set. When this metric is applied, the results are also as expected, with Category 1 missions returning more data than Category 2 missions which return significantly more data than Category 3 missions, the results of which are shown in Figure 5 . These metrics provide a different perspective of value for each mission class but each has its limitations. A primary assumption of the first metric is that all instruments provide equal science value. The basic rationale for this assumption is that each instrument is placed on-board a satellite to achieve a specific scientific objective and that all scientific 4 objectives are considered of equal value. The obvious limitation of such a metric is that all instruments are not created equal. The metric itself treats each instrument the same even though a very sophisticated imaging radar instrument is much more complex to develop than a simple magnetometer. It could be argued, however, that the value to the scientist utilizing the magnetometer data is the same as the scientist utilizing the data from a radar image as each is answering a relevant science question with the data obtained.
The primary assumption of the second metric is that every data bit generated by a science mission is of the same value as any other bit from another mission. This a limiting assumption, however, as an instrument that collects significant amounts of data, such as a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), would be deemed inherently more valuable than instruments that collect less data.
The value of each instrument that NASA launches cannot be understated. NASA employs a severely competitive science selection process using a peer review board of scientists to select the most valuable science from all proposals submitted. Table 3 identifies that, over the last 15 years of Small Explorer (SMEX) and the no longer existing University Explorer (UNEX) proposals submitted, only the top 6% were selected for implementation. Given the number of proposals submitted and the thoroughness of the evaluation process, it is believed that the science of these missions is of the best that can fit within the cost constraints. Additionally, given that mass, power and volume resources on a spacecraft are always tight and extremely valuable; each instrument has to "buy" its way onto the spacecraft such that the selection of each is warranted. For those missions that can be implemented within Category 3 funding constraints, the competitive process achieves high value science with the selected missions and instruments. The results shown in Figures 2 through 5 are as expected; although Category 1 and 2 missions are more expensive than Category 3 missions, they also fail less often and provide more science return per mission. This is a straightforward outcome given that Category 3 missions are made up of less reliable Class C and Class D missions while the reduced scope required to meet funding guidelines limit the number of instruments and years of operations thereby reducing the science return, as indicated by the instrument months and data returned metric.
Given that Category 3 missions are shown to provide such little science return and fail more often, why should Category 3 missions be attempted at all? The answer lies as being cost effective building blocks for future discoveries. Given that science return has been defmed with instrument months or as data returned, it is a simple task to divide the two proposed metrics by the total mission LCC to determine the cost-effectiveness of each mission. When viewed this way, these cost-effectiveness metrics measure the mission's "bang for the buck" or the amount of science gathered per dollar. This cost-effectiveness approach can be extended to each mission class by swnming the total instrument-moths or data returned for missions in a given class and dividing by the total LCC of the missions in that class. Computing these values, the data presented indicates that Category 3 missions are either the most cost effective category, as shown in Figure 6 relative to instrument months per dollar, or essentially equally as cost-effective, as shown in Figure 7 based on the data returned per dollar. As stated previously, there are certain scientific objectives that cannot be accomplished given the funding and subsequent size and complexity constraints of a Category 3 5 mISSIOn.
For those scientific objectives that can be implemented within the constraints of a Category 3 mission, however, the two metrics developed indicate that the mission implementations seem to provide a fairly cost effective acquisition strategy.
The data indicates that Category 3 missions can serve as a cost-effective, critical building block for a balanced portfolio of missions.
F AlLURE RE SULTS SUMMARY
As shown previously in Section 2.4, satellite failures have occurred more often in Category 3 missions than in Category 1 and 2 missions. As shown in Table 4 , the majority of these failures have been in the satellite flight system. In addition, Category 3 missions have a greater probability of being non-confirmed. Of the eight missions that were cancelled or not confirmed from 1997 to 2011, five of those missions were Category 3 missions. Given the 23 Category 3 missions launched, the five missions represent an 18% cancellation rate (i.e., 5 out of 28 total missions) which is significant. Combined with the failure statistics, this represents a probability of cancellation or failure for missions that are selected on the order of 39%. A further breakdown of the missions that have failed and the possible cause of failure or cancellation/non-confIrmation are provided in Table 5 . More detail on each mission is contained in the Appendix. Figure 8 , guidance for reviews is provided in one line. Although this line provides general guidance for overall reviews, it does not address specific requirements for reviews at a lower level.
NPR 7120.5E also provides some guidance relative to Category 1, 2 and 3 mission, as shown in Figure 9 and states that NASA Centers have the sole Technical Authority for Category 3 missions. Given that is the case, Center Directors can work with the Mission Directorate Associate Administrator (MDAA) to identify an acceptable review approach. Although Category 3 reviews are governed by
Full formal review NASA Centers, current policy does not provide good, universal guidance on the streamlining of reviews for Category 3 missions. [26] An example of the growing review requirements for Category 3 missions can be seen by the experience of the Small Explorer (SMEX) Aeronomy of Ice in the Mesosphere (AIM) mission. Initially the AIM team, as part of their proposal and Concept Study Report for the competed SMEX mission, proposed ten reviews for the major milestones. Due to circumstances originating over the initial concern about the cost of the mission and spacecraft, the AIM project was required by the Independent Integrated Review Team (IIRT) to hold over fifty reviews prior to mission CDR. As shown in Figure 10 , the 3 original reviews that were to encompass Systems Requirement Review (SRR), Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and the Confirmation Readiness Review activities expanded to include 29 reviews during that timeframe. [27] Although it is difficult to quantify the complete cost impact of such an increased review requirement, at minimum there was a significant disruption of project activities and progress. ------- Although the NASA AIM Project Manager also commented on the escalation of reviews that AIM experienced, he also stated the benefit of internal peer reviews in the following statements: "One type of review -peer reviews -were of significant value, particularly in the early phases of the project when technical input and critique were incorporated for a modest investment in time_ Some of the most effective peer reviews were small and informal with a modest number of expert participants_ On more than one occasion, however, the peer reviews were preceded by a dry run peer review to enable the design team to work issues_ As these reviews become more broadly attended with increased formality, they lose the original intent One wonders how this trend to formality might be reversed_" [28] Considerations for Streamlining
I
To more fully understand the possibility of streamlining reviews, the practice of two United States Air Force (USAF) organizations were investigated_ Although these organizations launch a variety of different types of missions, both launch a subset of missions that are equivalent in scope to NASA Category 3 missions and, for this subset, they experience a relatively high mission success rate_ It must be noted, however, that the missions developed by these organizations are primarily short term technology demonstration missions and, therefore, have different overall objectives than NASA science missions_ There should be some consideration given that technology demonstrations missions may be able to allow for some liberties that a NASA Science mission may not be able to take_ Given their relatively high success rate, however, an assessment of review practices of these organizations was conducted_ Figure 11 shows the failure rate of the STP and AFRL organizations as compared to the failure rate of NASA Category 3 missions_ As can be seen, the combined failure rate of STP and AFRL missions is significantly lower than for NASA missions_ In the same time period from 1997 to 2011, STP and AFRL have launched fourteen missions that are relatively equivalent to NASA Category 3 missions_ Of those 14 missions, only one experienced a spacecraft failure and only one experienced a launch vehicle failure for an overall failure rate of 14% as compared to the one launch vehicle and five spacecraft failures of the 23 NASA Category 3 missions launched in that same time period_ Based on the relative success of their missions, Aerospace personnel supporting these organizations were asked to provide comments on their review process in order to identify differences STP's and AFRL's review approach relative to NASA. When discussing the STP and AFRL review processes, it was clear that the reviews by themselves were not the primary contributing factor to the success of their missions. Both STP and AFRL have a unique, streamlined mission assurance approach that relies on identifying high risk elements early and then focusing on these risk areas with greater scrutiny while minimizing review of the lower or accepted risk items. Both STP and AFRL rely on the contractor's normal best practices while focusing on the high risk areas throughout the project while utilizing the major reviews as a discriminating gate for passage to the next phase. Although both STP and AFRL start with standard entry and exit criteria for major reviews, they streamline these criteria tailored to each mission based on the initial and continuing risk assessment. This provides for an environment where the limited review resources are focused on the items that matter the most.
Failure Rate Comparison
STP normally conducts the following formal reviews for each spacecraft it acquires: System Requirements Review (SRR The Aerospace Corporation (Aerospace) applies a process to tailor design review criteria for STP missions. All missions,
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Class A through D, start with the design review criteria outlined in the Aerospace Space Vehicle Systems Engineering Handbook. Aerospace then sends out a tailored version of the design review criteria with the tailoring based on how much funding has invested in the project. In some cases the criteria may be significantly tailored by taking a quick look of each of the major subsystems so that there is a level of confidence that the supplying organization is following good practices After approval by STP, the list is sent to the contractor for acknowledgement that these areas will or will not be addressed in the review. At this point, the contractor is provided the opportunity to negotiate scope. Once the criteria are decided upon, Aerospace attends the review and provides verbal comments and action items. STP has approval authority at major milestones and utilizes the verbal comments and action items as input. If the project does not pass the Design Review then STP requires that either all of the liens be properly closed or requires a Delta Design Review in order to enter the next phase.
STP also relies on many infonnation reviews conducted by the contractor as part of their normal practices. Technical Issue Reviews (TIRs) are infonnal. Peer Reviews of subassemblies are occasionally conducted and led by the contractors during development of the subsystems and software systems.
An Independent Readiness Review Team (IRRT), comprised of from 4-6 independent (of the program being evaluated) reviewers and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) as needed, is organized by SMC. The IRRT is usually comprised of personnel from several organizations.
Similarly, AFRL routinely only conducts the following reviews: SRR, PDR, CDR, PSR, MRR and participates in the SMC/CC FRR. In the past few years AFRL has also begun conducting an Operations Readiness Review (ORR) before the MRR . This focuses almost exclusively on the operations strategy, on-orbit and operations risks, and operations personnel readiness. The SRR, PDR, and CDR are usually 2 days in length and are chaired by the Program Manager with AFRL/RV leadership in attendance as spectators. The MRR is specifically chaired by the AFRL/R V Director.
In addition, AFRL routinely conducts an Independent Readiness Review (IRR), comprised of 4-6 independent (of the program being evaluated) reviewers plus subject matter experts (SMEs) as needed and as directed by the AFRLIRV Director. The IRR is usually supported by The Aerospace Corporation, with SMEs usually drawn from The Aerospace Corporation's engineering group. Peer Reviews are routinely and frequently conducted by the contractors during development of the subsystems and software systems. Occasionally Internal Design Reviews (IDRs) are conducted at the contractors; but such reviews are rare. AFRL mmUll lzes their documentation and distracting reviews. The ones conducted have over the years proven their worth. They have occasionally tried to do others; but the value never justifies the expense.
In terms of documentation, AFRL again produces documentation that has been proven by AFRL to be of value. They produce SRR, PDR, CDR and PSR briefmg slides but no other accompanying documentation. There is one exception: the System Requirements that are given to the contractor(s) are formally and contractually documented. There are no system specifications beyond what the contractor(s) consider in their contracts to be "normal, best practices" for them. The Government produces no such documents on AFRL projects. At the system-level, test planning is formalized but documentation is in Engineering Notebooks. Test procedures and results are published in formal, policy-compliant, short reports. A caution is that this "minimal documentation" can sometimes lead to an under-delivery of material that aids in the transitioning of technologies, which can be a hindrance to technology adoption. Design specifications (especially "as built" specs) and test reports that focus on what has been learned about the various technologies are distinctly lacking. However, it is the culture of AFRL to proceed cautiously in terms of adding tasks, reviews, or documentation without careful and controlled proof that the benefits outweigh (usually AFRL seeks "far outweighs" rather than just "outweighs") the costs (in dollars, time, and skills).
An additional, unique difference for AFRL missions includes the requirements development process. Virtually all requirements at AFRL are mutable; they are not "written in stone." The only requirements at AFRL that are typically "written in stone" are the Mission-level experiment requirements. These are the highest level of requirements and are established at the beginning of the project when it is formed.
All lower-level requirements are mutable and "negotiable" throughout the programs to balance cost, schedule and technical performance. AFRL works hard to ensure that requirements do not ever force them into compromised schedules or costs.
Recommendations
Mission Assurance is a combination of many processes and factors of which the reviews and review process is a limited part. The 2010-2011 Mission Assurance Improvement Workshop (MAIW) program addressed this issue in more detail in developing the "Mission Assurance Guidelines for A-D Mission Risk Classes" which is based on recommendations from a team comprised of government and industry team partners and interviews with different supporting organizations such as STP and AFRL. The goal of the team was to develop guidelines to defme characteristic profiles for mission assurance processes for a given space vehicle risk Class (A, B, C, or D) to serve as a recommended technical baseline suitable to meet program needs based on programmatic constraints and mission needs. Appendix B2 of the MAIW document specifically 9 relates to the review process as recommended for Class C and D missions -i.e., Category 3 missions -to ensure that the review process is commensurate with the level of accepted mission risk. [32] The following is a summary of the recommendations made by the MAIW relative to review requirements for Class C and D missions.
Class C Reviews Guideline-Risk-accepting Class C program reviews may not include the full suite of reviews. Early in the project-defmition phase less critical reviews may be eliminated to balance cost containment against the risk of late issue identification.
Planned reviews are typically documented in the project plan. Key reviews such as SRR, CDR, and MRR are generally held in compliance with contractor or industry standards. Review material generally follows standards for such reviews with some modification allowed to manage review cost. Items eliminated are perceived low risk to the project.
Class D Review Guidelines-High-risk tolerant projects typically hold only at a few key milestone reviews during their lifecycle. Key milestones include requirements defmition, design determination, prefabrication, and post hardware fabrication prior to transfer to the customer. These reviews typically include a few key internal to the contractor with contractor personnel who have similar project experience. External customers may be invited but are not required to participate. Review material is less formal in content and is often less than fully compliant with industry standards for such reviews. Early planning for all projects, including Class D projects, should include a discussion regarding the reviews to be held during the project's Iifecycle.
A primary lesson learned is that, prior to any review, it is beneficial for a project to perform an internal readiness review to verify that they are ready to start and complete the review at hand.
In addition, prior to conducting an independent review, the development of all entrance and exit criteria for each review to determine Mission Class A-D specific entrance and exit criteria would be useful to set the expectations for that specific review.
Also, required program Independent Reviews should be defined in the Project Management Plan during project kick-off. Lastly Independent Review (IR) criteria should be defmed early on to understand in the context of contractor policies. All reviews are given the following consideration:
Required, Recommended, Discretionary 2. Independence:
External, Internal, Developer 3. Completeness (see following paragraphs)
Review Completeness Guidelines for Class C Missions
Only core mission assurance topics described in the exit criteria will be reviewed. The Independent Review Team (lRT) works with program management to determine and review the high and medium-high risk/mission critical areas. Interviews conducted with key players in the high and medium risk/mission critical areas. Class C requires the program to prove completion by review of examples, 100% physical review is not required. Tailoring of Independent Review (IR) criteria is permitted to allow review of summary analysis of evidence is acceptable through agreement between the IRT leadership and the program office. IRs are typically performed on an ad hoc basis.
Review Completeness Guidelines for Class D Missions
Reviews performed only on core mission assurance required by launch safety or potentially impacting any higher-class payload (if rideshare configuration) described in the exit criteria. The IRT will work with project management to determine and review the high risk/mission critical areas. Interviews should be conducted on a subset of the key players only in the high risk/mission critical areas. Work is performed through a scaled down checklist pre-defmed by agreement between the IRT leadership and the project. Class D uses word of mouth or sampling as sufficient evidence, not necessarily requiring physical review of objective evidence. Significant tailoring of IR criteria is acceptable through agreement between the IRT leadership and the project which may not include SMEs from all technical disciplines (focus is on critical requirements of the mission). The IR is mostly considered an ad hoc function.
IR requirements are stated as Required, Recommended or Discretionary. Required reviews are formally part of the project per contract requirement following an internal/external standard. Recommended reviews are highly suggested following an internal/external standard that can be tailored from the suggested levels of independence and completeness. Discretionary reviews will be at the discretion of the project, contractor and/or customer following a defined process, which, at a minimum, should include the independence and completeness levels as indicated in the matrix.
The levels of independence are stated as Externally Independent, Internally Independent and Developer Independent.
Externally Independent reviewers are organizations or personnel that are technically, managerially, and financially independent of the contractor. Internally Independent reviewers are organizations or personnel that are within the contracting organization -i.e., NASA Center -that are technically, managerially, and financially independent of the project.
Developer Independent reviewers are organizations or personnel that are within the contractors that are technically independent of the review subject developer team.
A summary of the recommended reviews for Class C and D missions is shown in Table 6 . For Class C missions, CDR and MRR are the only reviews that are proposed to be required, while SRRlSDRlMDR, PDR, PSR and FRR are recommended with SIR and PER being discretionary. For Class D missions, given the high level of risk accepted and the minimal consequence for failure, no system-level reviews are proposed to be required with only CDR, PSR and MRR being recommended. All other reviews for Class D missions are considered discretionary. [32] Based on the MAIW recommendations presented in Table 6 , one interesting consideration is that the project's baseline confirmation review may need to be postponed until after CDR given that CDR is required for Class C missions, with PDR only recommended, whereas PDR is listed as fully discretionary for Class D missions. This would be in direct conflict with NPR 7120.5E, however, and would have to be given significant further thought. The study provides an assessment of NASA's Category 3 missions relative to Category I and 2 missions over the last 15 years. The data collected indicates that, although Category 3 missions cost less than Category 1 and 2 missions, they deliver less science and fail more often.
When looked at as a whole, however, Category 3 missions provide a cost effective acquisition approach for missions that can fit within the defined cost constraints. Simply stated, Category 3 missions are not effective for delivering much of NASA's mission portfolio but, when used in appropriate situations, they can be a very cost-effective tool to achieve specific science. In an effort to fully realize the benefits to a mission portfolio that includes Category 3 missions, it is recommended to leverage the review practices of the DOD STP and AFRL missions and recommendations made by the MAIW in an effort to potentially streamline the review process for Category 3 missions. As a next step, focused, streamlined mission assurance practices should also be investigated for Category 3 missions to potentially decrease the overall failure rate. This will also have a secondary, but important result of controlling cost and schedule increases. While this is a first step in the analysis, the continued success of NASA Category 3 missions is important for NASA's cost-constrained future.
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FAILURE RATE CASE STUDIES
The following includes a short summary of failed and cancelled/non-confirmed missions that is largely taken from [6] but has been updated with additional cases. The original references are included for the reader to do further research into the causes.
Case Studies for Spacecraft Failures
Lewis was launched on August 23, 1997 and re-entered the atmosphere on September 28 due to catastrophic failure. The goal of Lewis, to demonstrate advanced science instruments and new technologies for measuring changes in topography, was never reached as the spacecraft entered a flat spin in orbit resulting in loss of power to the solar arrays and eventual battery power discharge. Ground controllers lost contact on August 26. The attitude control system design had been adapted from a system used on the Total Ozone Mapping SpectrometerlEarth Probe (TOMS/EP) spacecraft. Investigation into the attitude control system found that insufficient analysis had been done to adapt this design to a different spacecraft spin-axis orientation. [7] [8]
Lack of knowledge about the behavior of the spacecraft in orbit resulted in rotational perturbations, which eventually led to an uncontrolled spin. Lewis was a Category 3 mission.
WIRE, the Wide-Field Infrared Explorer, launched on March 4, 1999 suffered catastrophic failure due to design error and analysis. Known characteristics about a component in the instrument electronic box were not considered in depth, leading to an electrical power surge reaching the explosive devices at startup. [9] The activation of the pyrotechnics resulted in premature ejection of the telescope's cover resulting in exposure of the frozen hydrogen (used as a coolant) and the telescopes infrared detectors to the sun. As the telescope heated, the hydrogen converted to gas and expelled entirely within a period of 48 hours from launch. Without the necessary cooling, the scientific mission was considered a loss. WIRE was a Category 3 mission. 14 The root cause of failure of the MCO mission was determined to be due to the use of English units rather than metric units in a ground software file. [11] The software fIle was used for trajectory modeling. This software design error coupled with over compensation of angular momentum desaturation during mission operations resulted in MCO's altitude at Mars insertion being 170 km lower than planned. [11] The investigation board concluded that either MCO was destroyed upon entering Mars' atmosphere or re-entered space leaving Mars' atmosphere. Software design error and lack of appropriate levels of program management I system engineering processes were also cited as contributing causes to the MCO failure. MCO's cost constraints and place it within the Category 3 mission classification.
MPL, the Mars Polar Lander, designed to study volatiles and climate history, was also built by Lockheed Martin under the JPL Mars Surveyor '9 8 contract. MPL was launched on January 3, 1999, and the anticipated communication between MPL and Earth during touchdown never occurred. This loss of communication initiated a recovery effort to try and communicate with MPL, with no success. Due to the lack of flight data available, the most probable cause as to the loss of MPL was determined to be due to the an early shutdown of MPL's descent engines during the touchdown phase. [12] The possible destruction of MPL was traced back to a software design error in the landing sensors. Lean program management and lack of key system engineering processes, in addition to a severely cost-constrained program exacerbated the situation leading up to the loss of MPL. MPL's cost, which due to lander development was higher than for MCO, would have placed the mission in Category 2.
CONTOUR, the Comet Nucleus Tour, launched on July 3, 2002 with the intended purpose of visiting mUltiple comets to perform a variety of investigations on the comet material. The spacecraft remained in Earth orbit until August 15, 2002 , when a solid rocket motor was fired to place the spacecraft on the trajectory to the first target. Communications were not possible during the firing and the operations team expected to regain contact with the spacecraft approximately 45 minutes after firing. Contact was never made. After numerous contact attempts with no success, the mission was declared lost on December 20, 2002 . While a number of reasons for the loss of the mission could not be completely ruled out, the probable cause was found to be overheating of the spacecraft from the solid rocket motor exhaust plume. The solid rocket motor was embedded within the structure of the spacecraft, as opposed to the typical external mounting, and the effect of the heating on the whole of the spacecraft from the exhaust plume was not correctly analyzed. It is possible that the heating led to catastrophic degradation of the structural integrity of the spacecraft. [13] The low cost implementation of CONTOUR designates the mission as Category 3.
Case Studies for Cancelled Missions
The Clark spacecraft never made it to launch due to cancellation of the program in February 1998. The primary goal of Clark was to produce black and white stereo images with resolution up to 3 m. Primary reasons for cancellation of the program can be attributed to a combination of concerns about cost overruns, payload health, and an uncertain launch schedule. Projection of cost to complete the mission showed a cost overrun of 15 percent. NASA had spent $55 million for the budgeted $49 million mission. [14] The instrument to be used on Clark had been sitting on the ground longer than had been expected, leading to reservations about its operation and health while in orbit. Lastly, scheduling conflicts with the Lockheed Martin Athena program resulted in further postponement of the mission. Many of the concerns leading to the cancellation of the Clark mission related to top-level requirements for the mission. Clark would have been a Category 3 mission.
ST -4, the Champollion/Comet Lander Space Technology-4 mission, was selected as a New Millennium Program (NMP) mission in 1998. ST-4 was planned to travel to, land on, and study comet 46P/Tempei 1 and (potentially) return a sample to Earth. [15] The mission was not approved to proceed to development in 1999 due to budgetary constraints caused by overruns in other mission. [16] ST-4, due to its expense, would have been a Category 2 mission.
VCL, the Vegetation Canopy Lidar (VCL) mission was selected in March 1997 as one of the fIrst two Earth System Science PathfInder (ESSP) missions. VCL was designed to utilize a multi laser Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) instrument to globally map the three-dimensional structure of the Earth's vegetation. Due to signifIcant developmental diffIculties with the instrument leading to projected cost growth, NASA decided to discontinue funding VCL in FY2001.
[17] VCL would have been a Category 3 mission.
IMEX, the Inner Magnetosphere Explorer (IMEX) mission was selected in September 1998 as one of the fIrst set of UNEX missions. IMEX was to have studied the response of Earth's Van Allen radiation belts to variations in the solar wind. In September 1998 IMEX entered Phase A, which was continued throughout FY99 due to launch vehicle unavailability. IMEX was to have entered Phase B in FY 2001 but, in January 2001, the project was not confIrmed for preliminary design due to cost growth. [18] IMEX would have been a Category 3 mission. FAME, the Full Sky Astrometric Mapping Explorer mission, was selected as a Medium Explorer (MIDEX) mission in October 1999. FAME was planned as an astrometric satellite designed to determine, with unprecedented accuracy, the positions, distances, and motions of 40 million stars within our galactic neighborhood. FAME was designed to measure stellar positions to less than 50 microarcseconds. The mission was not approved to proceed to development in early FY 2002, due to unacceptable cost growth, primarily in the 15 instrument, as identifIed at the ConfIrmation Review. [19] FAME, being a MIDEX mission, would have been a Category 2 mission. SPIDR, the Spectroscopy and Photometry of the IGMs Diffuse Radiation (SPIDR) mission was a SMEX mission selected in July 2002.
SPIDR was designed to map concentrations of extremely hot gas located in fIlaments between galaxies; astronomers hypothesize that this gas may constitute some of the dark matter thought to exist in the universe. NASA cancelled the mission after determining that the mission's main instrument would not be as sensitive as advertised. [20] SPIDR would have been a Category 3 mISSIOn.
CATSAT, the Co-operative Astrophysics and Technology Satellite, was selected under the STEDI program to investigate the distance and polarization of gamma bursts. The University of New Hampshire satellite was scheduled to launch in 2002 but the project was cancelled due to cost escalation. [21] CA TSA T would have been a Category 3 mission.
SIM, the Space Interferometry Mission, was a mISSIOn initially recommended by the 1991 Astronomy and Astrophysics Survey Committee as the Astrometric Interferometry Mission. SIM was to implement breakthroughs in precision control technology to measure the positions and distances of stars with unprecedented precision which could determine which small, rocky planets are in the habitable zones. Although development started in October 1998, there were substantial technology development hurdles to overcome. Although SIM met the majority of ground technology demonstrations, the mission was not approved to proceed to implementation in 2008 due to budgetary constraints with the Astrophysics budget allocation. [22] SIM, due to its expense and importance, would have been a Category 1 mission.
Case Studies for Launch Vehicle Failures
QuikTOMS, the Quick Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer, launched on September 21, 2001 on a Taurus was to monitor ozone in the Earth's atmosphere. The launch vehicle briefly went out of control soon after the second stage ignited. Though the launch vehicle got back on course and deployed the spacecraft, the loss of the momentum during the boost phase meant that the spacecraft did not reach the correct altitude and velocity to stay in Earth orbit. The spacecraft fell back to Earth over the Indian Ocean. The loss of control was traced to the thrust vector control actuator on the second stage which did not move as designed when the stage ignited.
[23] QuikTOMS was a Category 3 mission.
OCO, the Orbiting Carbon Observatory, launched on February 24, 2009 on a Taurus XL launch vehicle to make measurements to increase the understanding of carbon dioxide concentrations in the Earth's atmosphere. The mission was lost when the launch vehicle payload fairing failed to separate. The spacecraft separated from the third stage, but was still contained with the payload fairing. Due to the excess mass of the payload fairing, the spacecraft did not attain the correct altitude or velocity to remain in Earth orbit and fell back to Earth over the Pacific Ocean. The failure of the payload fairing to separate was traced to the design/operation of the separation system, though a specific failure mechanism could not be identified. [24] OCO was a Category 3 mission.
Glory launched on March 4, 2011 on a Taurus XL launch vehicle to study the role of aerosols on with respect to the Earth's climate. The mission was lost when the launch vehicle payload fairing failed to separate. The spacecraft, contained within the payload fairing, never made it to orbit and splashed down in the Pacific Ocean.
[25] Glory was a Category 2 mission.
